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This is guide is a collection of basic and advanced templates. The first section called "Basic Templates" includes all kind of regular templates which will work perfectly in every situation, even tho they are basic. The second section called "Advanced Templates" has several templates which are good only in certain situations.
This item has been added to your Favorites. Created by. Languages: English. Guide Index. Basic Templates. Types of tanks explanation. Advanced Templates. You should have this template behind the frontline. It would be helpful if there was some decent guidance on how to go about executing that something. Admittedly, there is a Marine Corps bias to the question. The service has a history of employment in all sorts of little, hard to pigeonhole, "small wars.
So, perhaps instead of an "a priori" approach, which is to take any given operation and try to cram it into some pre-determined doctrinal box, we ought to expand the toolbox. To take the analogy further, instead of being given a specific toolbox which may or may not work for the given task, the warfighter ought to be given the Craftsman rolling toolchest that allows him to select what he needs.
Is it a rebellion, an insurgency, a revolt? Those are probably the wrong doctrinal questions to be asking - yet those are the questions currently being asked. At the tactical level the questions are more likely to be - "well, here I am. So, who is the bad guy, why is he upset, how well armed is he, do people like him, do I have any friends here, are they worth a crap, what can I and what can't I do? I think that instead of seeking to place these questions into a pre-determined vocabulary, doctrine ought to just provide some answers.
Outlaw: I think we may be deviating off the intent of the original post - but your points are salient. I cannot speak to Army training, only to intel training in the Marines. In training an intelligence personnel, I've always looked at it as brillance in the basics. With some exceptions, I am reluctant to instruct current TTPs because they are either going to be obsolete by the time the student hits the fleet or they are going to get a crash course on it anyway. To me, that means my time is spent mentoring and allowing students to fail in a safe environment where they can learn from their mistakes without getting anyone killed.
Is it perfect -no, do I wish I could offer more, absolutely, but I can't keep them in the training forever. Aside from intel specific points, you also spend time teaching how intel relates to the other warfighting functions and how it supports planning. It is here where the most friction occurs. Training is not as sufficient as it could be, staffs are not coherent in the planning process, and training focuses more on check-lists than outcomes i. In terms of doing intelligence on the deck - it all depends on what you fall in on.
If literally no one has been in the AO before then there are some basic 5W questions that need answering. If you replace a unit then it's a bit easier. As I mentioned before, it really goes back into what your mission is and what you are trying to accomplish. If it's clear enemy in zone then my requirements are different. Truthfully, I could do either one of those missions without devoting a whole lot of time to "understanding" the populace, but my effectiveness may be limited. What is unfortunate are articles such as "Fixing Intel" that promulgate the thought that we are too focused on the enemy.
Rather, we get so clouded on worrying about the price of bread at the market that we forget about what really effects our ability to conduct the mission. So instead we put together brief after brief about KLEs that waste analytical effort on things that don't really matter. The schoolhouse hopefully knows about this particular problem, but you would be surprised how many former MI contractor types know it, but are unwilling to stand up and let the schoolhouse know --whoa I am not going to rock the system syndrome.
There are a number of presentations around the concept of observerables, signatures, and indicatorsyou are right in the older days we knew what the indicators were for a motorized rifle regt even if we did not "see" them yet on the battlefield we could sing them! Take the example of say HME or narco organizations, production, and smuggling activitieswhen do young officers and analysts first learn about the actual indicators and understanding how to detect when those indicators change.
They come then into a BN which forces them immediately into indicators--deleveop them, build your NAIs on them, build the collection plan around them, get staff buy-in for them and then an execute--and by the way on a continious unending cycleas an experiement stop the staff in the middle of that cycle and ask them WHY they are doing what they are doing. Nesting what a conceptget a battle staff into a single room and ask them to define nesting as a doctrinal term per pub--ask them to define say "running esitmate" per pub or define say "battle rhythm" per pub.
I do not know how many times I have seen top down bottom up refinement fail sometimes from the tactical level, but a majority of times as you point out from the operational side and you are right add multiple BNs on the ground and the complexity skyrocketsheck we even have now STBs as BSOs--not sure where that sits in doctrine.
But the tactical level has other problems that impact the next higher elechon. Those of us coming out of Iraq in and ran smack into a wall with the idea of templating--some said it cannot be done because insurgents are an adaptive organization, we do not have enough data yet on the various groups, they are working with locals who are simply doing a second job, it is foreign fighters etc.
You do not want to know just how many serious intel studies were started-finished-started again on just how many insurgents we were facing in and We had in the hand written journal by the leader of the IAI and it was never fully translated-just a short gisting it covered the period of two weeks after we arrived in Bagdah until mid absolutely ignored by the intel community.
If we had the buy-in from the intel community it might have happened far earlier as it was the intel community pushing back on the idea of templating--the concepts of CTCs reflecting templates only started occuring in mid when the COIC placed reach back capabilities in all CTCs. The core problem is not templates, or order of battle but how we "see" what is occuring around uswe are now graduating intel analysts with 3- to 4 weeks less of the required training time with the motto "they will get further training at their units" and we all know how that works out.
AND now we have defense contractors flooding out to intel analysts at home station giving them classes on "critical thinking"we are really on a treadmill and nothing is improving even ten years in.
Outlaw: I remember having a very similar conversation several months ago about the battle staff, planning, etc. Obviously the points are all valid - but I'd like to address some of your comments.
From your earlier post regarding templating and adaptive systems - you are right. No publication we have right now really tells you how to do it. FM does mention Social Network Analysis, but it's a bit too vague to be of any use. Locked Topic Sticky Topic Encuesta. Welcome, Visitantes. Please login or register. Did you miss your activation email? Paginas: [ 1 ] 2 BR Started by iCoder. SMF 2. Kriskiy and 2 Guests are viewing this board. November 13, , PM by edwint August 08, , AM by soitrangvn.
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